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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LELAND W. SIMPER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
HARRY THORSEN and MILDRED
THORSEN, husband and wife,

Civil No.
8305
~

Defendants and Appellants. )

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
AND RESPONDENT

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District in and for the County of Sevier
Honorable John L. Sevy, Jr., Judge

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Throughout this brief we will refer to the parties as
they are designated in the lower court in the manner
adopted by the Appellant.
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The statement of facts prepared by the Defendants is
substantially accurate, but in order fully to apprise the
Court of the Plaintiff's position we believe it to be necessary to set out the following:
The Plaintiff has owned and operated a ranch located
in Gooseberry, Salina Canyon, Utah since the .1Oth day of
February, 1930 (R. 28, 29). He received the title to the
property by Warranty Deed from his father, Thomas W.
Simper (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1).
He grazed cattle on his property and also raised crops
of grain, hay and occasionally raised potatoes (R. 29). The
land, in order to produce crops, required irrigation and the
Plaintiff obtained water from a right in Gooseberry Creek,
which water is not involved in this action, and from a spring
area known as Branch Springs "located in the lower end of
Kelsy Bird's field", (R. 49, 64, and 65, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 2) , land now owned by Ern ell Peterson ( R. 64, 115).
Branch Spings is designated on Defendants' Exhibit "A"
as Spring Area No. 1. Also, Plaintiff received water from
Reservoir No. 2 located on property now owned by the Defendants designated on Defendants' Exhibit "A" as Spring
Area No.2.
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The Plaintiff would take water from these spring areag
1~~ 11'ater
through a well defined natural channel which runs in a
northerly direction to his land (R. 46 & 116). The water, 1l~m~lete
if unobstructed, would run from Branch Springs, or Spring
Area No. 1, into a small pond known as Ernell Peterson's
Pond, then into its natural channel known as "C" Ditch
~!er. ~
(R. 69, 110). The channel continued into an area which . Jlmng;
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3
gathered water from Spring Area No. 2 on the way to
Plaintiff's land (R. 45, 72 & 94).
The Plaintiff derived his right and title involved in this
action through an assignment from his father, Thomas W.
Simper, by an instrument dated September 19th, 1932 (R.
33, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2). His father in turn acquired
the rights from one Charles A. Mott under a certain deed
executed December 31st, 1888 and recorded January 11th,
1889 in the records of Sevier County (Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 3) . These instruments of conveyance are more fully
discussed in Plaintiff's Argument herein. Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that he had use of the water
from the described spring areas during the time he has
owned his land at Gooseberry with the exception of some
interruptions (R. 39, 83, 96, 105). Witnesses o(the Plaintiff also testified that water from the described spring areas
was used on the land by the Plaintiff and his predecssors
in title so long as they could recall and back to the year of
1908 or 1910 (R. 100, 101, 102, & 112). During the course
of the trial there is no testimony from either witnesses of
the Plaintiff or the Defendants that all of the water from
these sources was ever denied the Plaintiff. It was affirmatively shown that the Plaintiff has had a continuous use
of water from the spring areas and that the flow was never
completely stopped (R. 81, 102, 110, 138).
During the month of May, 1951, the Plaintiff had
trouble with the Defendant, Harry Thorsen, regarding the
water. The Plaintiff after that date dammed off ditches
leading to Defendants' property on several occasions. Thereafter on September 19th, 1951, the Plaintiff filed a com-
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plaint and commenced this action against the Defendants
seeking damages and a determination of his rights to the
waters involved in this controversy.
The Court after hearing the evidence and having
viewed the spring areas, made a finding that the Branch
Springs were one and the same springs as those designated
by the Defendants' Exhibit "A" as Spring Area No. 1, and
entered the Decree quieting Plaintiff's title to all waters
arising therefrom (R. 15, 18). The Court reserved any
finding or award on Spring Area No. 2 and stated that
there was insufficient evidence to justify a finding of appropriation and use of waters by either the Plaintiff or
Defendants (R. 11). From this decision of the Court, the
Defendant has appealed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL
OF SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDES ALL
THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S
FINDING THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSOR IN TITLE, ACQUIRED
OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS FROM
BRANCH SPRING WHICH INCLUDES THE
WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1, BY A
DEED EXECUTED BY CHARLES A. MOTT.
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POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE USE OF ALL THE WATERS
FROM BRANCH SPRING WHICH INCLUDES
THE WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ADMITTING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS "1"
THROUGH "4" AND PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NONSUIT.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR A DECREE QUIETING TITLE IN THEM TO
BRANCH SPRING WHICH THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND TO INCLUDE ALL THE WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1.
POINT VI.
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR
IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CAUSE.
POINT VII.
THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSING TO FIND IN DEFENDANTS'
FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS'
DAMAGES.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL
OF SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDES ALL
THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN.
The waters not involved in this controversy which
should be distinguished are those from Gooseberry Creek.
The other waters described in Defendants' brief as the
spring located in the immediate northwest corner of Spring
Area No. 1 which they have termed the pipe spring, is a
part of Spring Area No. 1 or Branch Springs. The water
described as Spring Area No. 2 includes what is described
as Reservoir No.2 in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. The Appellants'
contend that the findings and decree of the lower court, as
well as its decision and memorandum of August 1, 1953 (R.
10 through 19), together with its order overruling motion
for new trial (R. 21, 22) show that the court failed to make
any distinction whatever in the identity of water rights
involved. It is clearly apparent from the record that the
court understood and identified the water involved in this
action and that the record fully supports the decision of
the court.
The witness, George Simper, testified that this water
was all of the water designated by Defendants in their
exhibits and testimony as the Spring Area No. 1.

R. p. 101:
"Q. (Mr. Beal) And those waters, and all of
them, derived in this area were used by your father,
and with your assistance, on this farm?
"A. Yes Sir.
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"Q. Was your right ever interrupted or disturbed?
"A. No sir ; not in the early days ; there was
nobody there to interrupt or take it.
"Q. And this property here that is now claimed
by Mr. Thorsen or the property that. was owned by
Mr. Bird, was public domain at that time you were
there, was it?
"A. That's right."

R. p. 100:
"Q. But you were there when your father
owned it?
"A. Yes, a long time ago.
"Q. Calling your attention to-What years
would that have been, George?
"A. Well, that would date back to probably
about 1908 or 10, up until forty or forty five.
"Q. And so during that period of time you
have had rather intimate operations of this area,
have you?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Now, where is the source of water derived
from that was used during those years for irrigation
of this land that is now operated and owned by your
brother?
"A. Well, the deeded water came out of the
creek, the Gooseberry Creek, and they had acquisition to those springs you have been referring to."

This testimony clearly shows the water covered by the deeds,
Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 & 3, to have been all the waters of
Branch Spring, and all the waters of Branch Spring to have
been all that water arising in Spring Area No. 1 as designated by Defendants. The testimony of Leland Simper,
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plaintiff in this action, also identifies Branch Springs and
Spring Area No. 1 as one and the same water sources from
which his water came (R. 81, 82).
As we have argued in Point I hereinabove, while the
trial court may have erroneously designated the Branch
Spring to be synonymous with the Big Spring, nevertheless
there is ample evidence to support the fact that the court
was clear in its identification of the water sources, as shown
by its Decision and Memorandum (R. 10, 13) and to support the court's finding that Branch Spring included all of
the Spring A rea No. 1.
The court viewed the premises and used the following
language in its memorandum (R. 13) in identifying Branch
Springs as one and the same as that spring area and the
water sources designated as Spring Area No. 1:

"* * * the physical evidence discloses that
all of the several channels or branches of said spring,
if unobstructed and uninterfered with, naturally
flow to the area of what is described in Defendants'
Exhibit A as the Ernel Peterson pond from whence
they flow into the natural channel or "C" ditch, described in the last-named exhibit, and thence to
Plaintiff's lands, and Plaintiff's evidence shows that
he and his predecessor father have always used
beneficially all waters that came through said natural channel or "C" ditch to his farm, and this appears to be the only course these waters, if uninterfered with, could have taken since their deeding by
Mott to Simper."
The decision of the court and the position of the Plaintiff
is further substantiated by the showing that the Defendants
expressly admit that the Plaintiff is entitled to all those
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waters flowing from the pipe spring which was one of the
springs designated in Spring Area No. 1 or Branch Springs.
It is shown by testimony that the spring flowed from a two
inch pipe and that it flowed a very small stream (R. 184).
This amount of water would not be sufficient to flow any
distance, let alone the distance to the Plaintiff's land, and
in a force sufficient to be used for irrigation purposes. It
is clearly apparent that more water was available to Plaintiff and was used by the Plaintiff.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S
FINDING THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSOR IN TITLE, ACQUIRED
OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS FROM
BRANCH SPRING WHICH INCLUDES THE
WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1, BY A
DEED EXECUTED BY CHARLES A. MOTT.
POINT III.

.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE USE OF ALL THE WATERS
FROM BRANCH SPRING vVHICH INCLUDES
THE WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ADMITTING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS "1"
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THROUGH "4" AND PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NONSUIT.
Since the Defendants and Appellants have consolidated
their argument upon these points, and Plaintiff and Respondent will respond similarly.
We agree with Appellants that whoever first appropriated water by beneficial use prior to 1903 is the owner
thereof and entitled to pass title thereto. We likewise agree
that the law prior to 1903 required no certification or recording of such rights; that title was and must continue
to be based on proof of use.
We cannot agree, however, that deeds and memoranda
are incompetent and inadmissible as proof of ownership of
water where title is in controversy.
While we concede that ordinarily self-serving documents and memoranda, including deeds, are not competent
evidence against third parties, we nevertheless contend that
the Plaintiff's Exhibit "3" falls within a well defined exception to that rule, that of recitals in Ancient Deeds. It is
well settled that recitals in ancient deeds are competent
evidence of facts recited therein even as against strangers
to the title, when accompanied by possession under the deed
or other corroborating circumstances. 20 Am. Jur. 794,
Evidence, Sec. 941. Exhibit "3" of Plaintiff is such a deed.
Exhibit "3" is a deed executed December 31, 1888, recorded January 11, 1889, from Charles A. Mott to Thomas
W. Simper, Plaintiff's grantor, in which it is recited that
for the consideration of $200.00, [which the trial court
found to be "substantial" (R. 10)] the grantor conveyed
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"the Branch Spring of water, lying and being situate at
the lower end of Kelsey Bird's field, Gooseberry Precinct,
Sevier County, Utah; said spring located October 1884 and
duly recorded to the party of the first part December 21,
1888 in Book G-1, page 47, Sevier County Records."
As has been argued in our Point No. I hereinabove, we
contend that the court properly found, after hearing the
evidence and viewing the physical properties involved, that
the "Branch Spring" referred to in that deed embraces the
entire water source within "Spring Area No. 1."
If the Branch Spring includes all those waters, then
the remaining question is whether or not there is sufficient
evidence upon which to base the court's finding of a diligence right, acquired by beneficial use prior to 1903, by
Charles A. Matt.

In the recent case of Edmunds v. Plianos, 74 S.D. 260.
51 N. W. 2d 701, it was held that a recital in an ancient
deed as to the existence of an alley at the rear of property
conveyed is competent evidence of the fact of dedication of
the alley. The dearth of satisfactory evidence there made
it proper to admit the ancient deeds even as against strangers to the title.
In Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U. S. 389, 29 L. Ed. 915,
6 S. Ct. 780, the United States Supreme Court has held that
a deed more than 60 years old may be admitted in evidence
against third parties to prove contained recitals even in
the absence of proof of possession by the parties offering
it.
No case closer to the facts involved here could be found
than the reported decision preceding the note in 6 A. L. R.
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found at page 1433, Gabarino v. Noce, 183 P. 532, where it
is said that:
"Having been executed for more than 50 years
before the present controversy arose [the deed]
comes within the rules of evidence applicable to
ancient deeds and hence the recitals therein relating
to the property conveyed are competent evidence of
the facts recited even against strangers to the deed
* * * The recitals tend to show that the ditch
was originally conducted by the owner of the lot for
the purpose of conveying water from the creek to
that lot. The fact that the title deeds of the Garbarino lot show this particular ditch as an appurtenance while the title deeds of the other lots make no
mention thereof, is some evidence, at least, that the
right thereto was not claimed by the owner of the
other lots at the time of making the conveyances
thereof."
In Condit v. Galveston City Co., 186 S. W. 395, where
title to shares of corporate stock were in controversy, a
deed recited that the certificate in question was sold at
public auction pursuant to an order of the probate court.
The Plaintiffs contended that such evidence was inadmissible, in the absence of any evidence showing that the transferee or any person claiming under him had enjoyed possession or shown acts of ownership. In that case, it was
held that the ancient deed was properly admitted to prove
the recitals.
In the instant case, there is ample testimony of "corroborating circumstances" as indicated in the note from
American Jurisprudence, in the evidence of consistent use
in the years 1908 or 10 to 1945 (R. 100-102). In the Texas
case, even this requirement was not present. Certainly the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial courts view of the premises established a consistent
use (R. 13).
Recitals in ancient instruments have been held admis
sible to prove extent of title, source of title, and existence
of other supporting instruments. Annotation, 6 A. L. R.
1437.
The reported case to that annotation holds that "it
[the ancient deed] is also competent as a declaration of the
grantor while in possession, as evidence that he then claimed
full ownership of the ditch and water right."
Ancient deeds are admitted as proof of their recitals
as an exception to the hearsay rule upon the theory that
time and possession have raised the presumption of their
truth, which is admissible even as against strangers.
The rule admitting ancient deeds to prove recitals
therein contained pertaining to water rights appurtenant
to the lands conveyed should reach great eminence in the
state of Utah under its peculiar statutory and case law
relating to diligence rights to the use of water.
The time is rapidly approaching when direct testimony
of use prior to 1903 will be absolutely unobtainable. Even
today one, in order to have a recollection of occurrences
antedating 1903, must be of an age in the early seventies.
To adopt a rule urged by the Appellants that a predecessor in title's use must be established and proved by
direct testimony would be to establish a rule making multitudes of anciently established water rights unaffirmablc
by judicial proof.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
In the trial court's memorandum (R. 12-14) it is clearly
shown that the deeds were not given controlling weight,
and possibly not even the weight to which, under the foregoing decisions, they were entitled. The Court says: (R.
11, last sentence, and 12) .
"Charles A. Matt has assertedly located said
spring in 1884 and recorded it in 1888, and while
there is no competent evidence (a statement which
apperently is refuted in the cited cases) in the
record that Charles A. Mott ever himself put these
waters to a beneficial use or that he owned land in
that vicinity, the physical evidence [coming on
through the court's view of the premises] (R. 10)
discloses that all the several channels or branches of
said spring, if unobstructed and uninterfered with,
naturally flow to the area which is described in Defendants' Exhibit A as the Ernel Peterson pond
from whence they flow into the natural channel or
"C" ditch, described in the last named exhibit, and
thence to Plaintiff's lands, and Plaintiff's evidence
shows that he and his predecessor father have always used beneficially all waters that came through
said natural channel or "C" ditch to his farm and
this appears to be the only course these waters, if
uninterfered with, could have taken since their deed
by Mott to Simper.
"The Defendant, as far as beneficial use prior
to 1903 is concerned, which is the only basis on
which he could rest his claim, is compelled to base
his case solely upon the testimony of witnesses,
* * * [who] were 3 and 5 years old when they
settled with their parents 3,4 miles north of Branch
Spring, and who were 8 and 10 years old in 1903,
* * * more than 50 years after they left the
scene of action.

*

*

*

*

*
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"However, taking the evidence as a whole, including the physical conditions disclosed by a view
of the premises, I am of the opinion that the evidence of ownership of said waters, based on purchase, appropriation and beneficial use prior to and
including the year 1903, preponderates in favor of
the Plaintiff."
These are the findings which the Appellants must overcome
by a showing that the trial court, having heard the witnesses, and viewed the premises, has misapplied proven
facts or found against the clear preponderance of the evi· ·
dence. (Cranford et al. v. Gibbs, ... Utah, 1st Series, ... ,
260 P. 2d 870.
As to the evidence referenced in pages 21 to 25 of Appellants' brief, we agree with the trial court that this is no
more than recurring interruptions by Defendants and their
predecessors, and as to this we agree with Appellants when
they sayp that they must do more than establish nonexistence or inferiority of Plaintiff's title in order to prevail
themselves.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR A DECREE QUIETING TITLE IN THEM TO
BRANCH SPRING WHICH THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND TO INCLUDE ALL THE WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1.
In our Point No. V we shall address ourselves to the
errors assigned by Defendants (here Appellants) in both
their Points Numbered V and VI.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
The trial court, close to the scene of events, hearing
the witnesses, and v:iewing the premises, properly appraised
the testimony of Casto (R. 156) and Nielsen (R. 204) in
his memorandum decision (R. 13) where he says:
"The Defendant, as far as beneficial use prior
to 1903 is concerned, which is the only basis upon
which he could rest his claim, is compelled to base his
case solely upon the testimony of witnesses, a brother
and a sister, children of Able N. Casto, one of Defendants' predecessors, which children were three
and five years old, respectively, when they settled
with their parents, not at, but some % of a mile
north of Branch Spring, and who were eight and
ten years old, respectively, in 1903, at and prior to
which time the rights of the respective parties herein were fixed and which said brother and sister testified in the case, more than fifty years after they
left the scene of action involved· in the case.
"It is true, there is abundant evidence of almost
constant interference with Plaintiff's use of said
water, especially since John M. Bird's purchase in
1933, from Able N. Casto, of the property now owned
by the Defendant and also evidence in the wording
of the deed from Able N. Casto to John M. Bird that
Casto claimed ownership, in which might appear to
be some of said waters.
"[The court later amended the memorandum
to show that Casto and Nielsen were there until
1900, at which time they reached the ages of 16
and 18 respectively, but did not consider this sufficient to justify any change in his original decision
(R. 21-22)] ."

The specific reference of the court to this testimony discounts the Defendants' contention that the court "ignored
portions of the Plaintiff's case" (Br. App., p. 28).
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We disagree with Defendants-Appellants in their italicized statement on page 37 of their brief where they declare
that "there is no evidence in the record to antedate the title
of plaintiff's predecessors" which fact they attempted to
prove by the testimony of Casto and Nielsen, who came to
the area in 1887 (R. 156). We doubt seriously that those
witnesses at the ages of 3 and 5 would have any recollection
whatsoever as to evidence in 1887 but, on the contrary,
urge that the deed admitted into evidence (entirely prop·erly, as argued in Points II, III, and IV herein) establishes
a use of the Branch Springs-which the trial court found to
include all the waters in Spring Area No. l-in October
1884, the location of which date was recorded December
21, 1888 in Book G-1, page 47 of the Sevier County records.
Perhaps previous counsel for Plaintiff should have
introduced a certified copy of the instrument referred to
which has been since 1888 a matter of public record. However, the ancient document found at page 359 of the record
proves the prior instrument. Fulkerson v. Holmes, supra.
In any event, there are documents in existence and entered
upon the public records since 1888 showing Plaintiff's appropriation of Branch Spring which the trial court found
to be the equivalent of Spring Area No. 1.
With this factual premise we then agree entirely with
Defendants that the controlling legal principle is that which
they cite on page 36 of their brief, that "until 1903 when
an exclusive method for appropriating water was prescribed
by statute, water could be appropriated merely by diverting
the water from its natural channel and putting it to a
beneficial use."
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Subsequent uses by Defendants' predecessors in interest, and at a time when the witnesses Casto and Nielsen had
attained an age of 14 or 16 years of age, the earliest possible
age at which evidence as to their recollection could be at
all creditable, could not initiate any right but were only
interferences with an established right if such uses were
in fact made.
Certainly this was the rationale of the court's finding
on page 13 of the record.
POINT VI.
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR
IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CAUSE.
The trial court at page 21 and 22 of the record considered the exceptions to the court's findings and rejected
them. The attack was solely upon his findings of fact which
we believe to be fully and adequately supported by the record and which, in any event, as a matter of law cannot be
upset except by a clear and convincing showing that the
court has misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly
against the weight of evidence. Cranford v. Gibbs, ... Utah
... , 260 P. 2d 870.
POINT VII.
THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSING TO FIND IN DEFENDANTS'
FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS'
DAMAGES.
Upon the issue of damages, no case could have clearer
application than Cranford v. Gibbs, supra. The testimony of
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the defendants as to their own damages is based solely upon
speculation and is not bottomed on logic or analogy. We
first contend that the defendants were never entitled to any
of the waters and therefore entitled to no damages for expropriation by the Plaintiff. Assuming, arguendo only,
this not to be the case, then we see no sufficient basis upon
which the trial court could find other than he did that damages were based upon theories too speculative for an award.
As to Defendants' claimed loss of alfalfa hay, this could
be attributable to any number of causes: Poor husbandry,
extreme drought, an unusually short growing season, or
inclement weather.
The same would apply to natural feed and other crops.
The major portion of Defendants' claimed damages
were in deficiencies in livestock production which the Defendants themselves tie directly to inferior and limited hay
supplies. Besides being subject to the great margin fm·
error in assuming that lack of water contributed to this
condition, then speculation as to what their livestock would
have produced becomes much more broadly speculative and
even more remote and uncertain.
It appears that nothing was done by the Defendants to
mitigate this loss or to prevent this damage.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully contended that the trial court ha~
fairly and adequately determined all the facts before him
in this trial. We believe that there is no manifest showing
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of a misapplication of proven facts or a finding of fact
clearly against the weight of evidence.
We believe the trial court ought to be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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